



GLASS LEWIS

Public Pension Policy

An Overview of Glass Lewis' Public Pension
Thematic Voting Policy

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ABOUT GLASS LEWIS

Glass Lewis is the world's choice for governance solutions. We enable institutional investors and publicly listed companies to make sustainable decisions based in research and data. We cover 30,000+ meetings each year, across approximately 100 global markets. Our team has been providing in-depth analysis of companies since 2003, relying solely on publicly available information to inform its policies, research, and voting recommendations.

Our customers include the majority of the world's largest pension plans, mutual funds, and asset managers, collectively managing over \$40 trillion in assets. We have teams located across the United States, Europe, and Asia-Pacific giving us global reach with a local perspective on the important governance issues.

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The research team engages extensively with issuers, investors, regulators, and other industry stakeholders to gain relevant context into the realities surrounding companies, sectors, and the market in general. This enables us to provide the most comprehensive and pragmatic insights to our customers.

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INTRODUCTION

The Public Pension Policy are designed to ensure compliance with the special fiduciary responsibilities of public pension plan sponsors in voting proxies on behalf of public employees. The guidelines are designed for investors with extremely long-term investment horizons. While the Policy reflects analysis and identification of both financial and corporate governance risk, the Public Pension Policy also includes consideration of stakeholder interests in making proxy voting decisions. The Public Pension Policy encourages increased reporting and disclosure on the part of portfolio companies including in executive compensation, governance, labor practices and the environment.

The Public Pension Policy acts as an overlay for Glass Lewis' benchmark policies. Accordingly, the Public Pension Policy guidelines are underpinned and informed by the Glass Lewis benchmark policy guidelines. Implementation of the Public Pension Policy may vary market-to-market in accordance with regulatory requirements, corporate governance best practices, and other relevant standards in individual markets. Detailed information on the contents and implementation of Glass Lewis' benchmark guidelines for all major global markets are publicly available on the Glass Lewis website.

There have been no material changes made to the Public Pension Policy in advance of the 2021 proxy season.

ELECTION OF DIRECTORS

Board of Directors

Boards are established in order to represent shareholders and protect their interests. The Public Pension Policy seeks boards that have a record for protecting shareholders and delivering value over the medium- and long-term. For boards that wish to protect and enhance the interests of shareholders they must have sufficient levels of independence (the percentage varies by local market practice and regulations), boast a record of positive performance, have directors with diverse backgrounds, and appoint new directors that have a depth of relevant experience.

Board Composition

The Public Pension Policy examines a variety of elements to the board when voting on director elections. In terms of the directors, the policy looks at each individual on the board and explores their relationship with the company, the company's executives and with other board members. This is to ensure and determine whether a director has an existing relationship with the company that are likely to impact any decision processes of that board member.

The biographical information provided by the company on the individual director is essential for investors to understand the background and skills of the directors of the board. This information should be provided in the company's documents well in advance of the shareholder meeting, in order to give shareholders sufficient time to analyze the information. In cases where the company fails to disclose the names or backgrounds of director nominees, the Public Pension Policy may vote against or abstain from voting on the directors' elections.

The Public Pension Policy will vote in favor of governance structures that will drive positive performance and enhance shareholder value. The most crucial test of a board's commitment to the company and to its shareholders is the performance of the board and its members. The performance of directors in their capacity as board members and as executives of the company, when applicable, and in their roles at other companies where they serve is critical to this evaluation.

Directors are formed into three categories based on an examination of the type of relationship they have with the company. The table below includes a breakdown of how Glass Lewis classifies these director relationships with the company.

Insider	Affiliate	Independent
Someone who serves as a director and as an employee of the Company	A director who has a material financial, familial or other relationship with the company, or its executives, but is NOT an employee of the company	No material financial, familial or other current relationships with the company, it's executives or other board members except for service
May also include executive chairs (who act as an employee of the company or is paid as an employee of the company)	A director who owns or controls, directly or indirectly 20% or more of the company's voting stock (except where local regulations or best practices set a different threshold).	A director who owns, directly or indirectly less than 10% of the company's voting stock (local regulations and best practices may set a different threshold)
	>A director who has been employed by the company within the past 5 calendar years	>A director who has not been employed by the company for a minimum of 5 calendar years
	>A director who performs material consulting, legal, advisory, accounting or other professional services for the company	>A director who is not involved in any Related Party Transactions (RPT) with the company (most common RPT's - Consulting, Legal, and Accounting/Advisory services)
	>A director who is involved in an "Interlocking Directorship"	

Common other reasons the Public Pension Policy will vote against a director:

- (i) A director who attends less than 75% of the board and applicable committee meetings.
- (ii) A director who is also the CEO of a company where a serious restatement has occurred after the CEO certified the pre-restatement financial statements.
- (iii) An affiliated director when the board is not sufficiently independent in accordance with market best practice standards.
- (iv) An affiliate or insider on any of the key committees (audit, compensation, nominating) or an affiliate or insider on any of the key committees and there is insufficient independence on that committee, both of the above can vary in accordance with the markets best practice standards.

The following conflicts of interests may hinder a director's performance and may result in a vote against:

- (i) A director who presently sits on an excessive number of public company boards (see the relevant market guidelines for confirmation of the excessive amount).
- (ii) Director, or a director whose immediate family member, or the firm at which the director is employed, provides material professional services to the company at any time during the past three years.
- (iii) Director, or a director whose immediate family member, engages in airplane, real estate or other similar deals, including perquisite type grants from the company.
- (iv) Director with an interlocking directorship.
- (v) All board members who served at a time when a poison pill with a term of longer than one year was adopted without shareholder approval within the prior twelve months.
- (vi) A director who has received two against recommendations from Glass Lewis for identical reasons within the prior year at different companies.

Board Independence

A board composed of at least two-thirds independent is most effective in protecting shareholders' interests. Generally, the Public Pension Policy will vote against responsible directors if the board is less than two-thirds independent, however, this is also dependent on the market best practice standards.

Board Committee Composition

It is best practice to have independent directors serving on the audit, compensation, nominating and governance committees. As such, the Public Pension Policy will support boards with this structure and encourage change when this is not the case. However, board committee independence thresholds may vary depending on the market.

With respect to the creation of board committees and the composition thereof, the Public Pension Policy will generally support shareholder proposals requesting that companies create a committee to oversee material E&S issues, such as committees dedicated to climate change oversight or the oversight of public policy risks. The Public Pension Policy will also generally support shareholder proposals calling for the appointment of directors with specific expertise to the board, such as those requesting the appointment of an environmental expert or an individual with significant human rights expertise.

Board Diversity, Tenure and Refreshment

The Public Pension Policy acknowledges the importance of ensuring that the board is comprised of directors who have a diversity of skills, backgrounds, thoughts, and experiences. As such, having diverse boards benefits companies greatly by encompassing an array of different perspectives and insights.

In terms of board tenure and refreshment, the Public Pension Policy strongly supports routine director evaluations, including independent external reviews, and periodic board refreshment in order to enable the company to maintain a fresh set of ideas and business strategies in an ever-changing world and market. Having directors with diverse experiences and skills can strengthen the position of a company within the market. Therefore, the Public Pension Policy promotes refreshment within boards, as a lack of refreshment can lead to poor company performance. Thus, the Public Pension Policy may consider voting against directors with a lengthy tenure (e.g. over 12 years) when we identify significant performance or governance concerns indicating that a fresh perspective would be beneficial and there is no evidence of any plans of future board refreshment.

The Public Pension Policy will also evaluate a company's policies and actions with respect to board refreshment and diversity. As a part of this evaluation, we will review the diversity of board members and support shareholder proposals to report on or increase board diversity. The nominating and governance committee, as an agent for the shareholders, is responsible for the governance by the board of the company and its executives. In performing this role, the committee is responsible and accountable for selection of objective and competent board members. To that end, the Public Pension Policy will: (i) vote against members of the nominating committee in the event that the board has an average tenure of over ten years and the board has not appointed a new nominee to the board in at least five years; or (ii) vote against the male members of the nominating committee in instances where the board is comprised of fewer than 30% female directors for large-cap companies, or against the nominating committee when there is not at least one woman on the board at mid- and small-cap companies.

Director Overboarding

For U.S. companies, the Public Pension Policy will closely review director board commitments and will vote against directors serving on more than five total boards, for directors who are not also executives; and against directors serving more than two total boards, for a director who serves as an executive of a public company.

Board Size

Although there is not a universally acceptable optimum board size, boards should have a minimum of five directors to ensure sufficient diversity in decision making and to enable the establishment of key committees with independent directors. Further, boards should not be composed of more than 20 directors as the board may suffer as a result of too many voices to be heard and have difficulty reaching consensus on issues with this number of members. As a result, the Public Pension Policy will generally vote against the chair of the nominating committee at a board with fewer than five directors or more than 20 directors.

Classified Boards

The Public Pension Policy favors the repeal of staggered boards in favor of the annual election of directors. Staggered boards are generally less accountable to shareholders than annually elected directors to the board. In addition, the annual election of directors encourages board members to focus on protecting the interests of shareholders. Further to this, if shareholders are unsatisfied with board members the annual election of directors allows them to voice these concerns.

Controlled Companies

The Public Pension Policy allows certain exceptions to the independence standards at controlled companies. The board's main function is to protect shareholder interests, however, when an individual, entity, or group own more than 50% of the voting shares, the interests of majority shareholders are the interests of that entity or individual. As a result, the Public Pension Policy does not apply the usual two-thirds independence threshold on controlled companies instead it includes the following guidelines:

- (i) As long as insiders and/or affiliates are connected to the controlling entity, the Public Pension Policy will accept the presence of non-independent board members.
- (ii) The compensation, nominating, and governance committees do not need to consist solely of independent directors. However, the compensation committee should not have any insider members, but affiliates are accepted.
- (iii) The board does not need an independent chair or an independent lead or presiding director.
- (iv) The audit committee should consist solely of independent directors, regardless of the controlled status of the company.

Significant Shareholders

Significant shareholders are either an individual or an entity which holds between 20-50% of a company's voting power, and the Public Pension Policy provides that shareholders should be allowed proportional representation on the board and in committees (excluding the audit committee) based on their percentage of ownership.

Director Performance and Oversight

Board members performance and their actions in regard to performance of the board is an essential element to understanding the board's commitment to the company and to shareholders. The Public Pension Policy will look at the performance of individuals as directors and executives of the company and of other companies where they have served. Often a director's past conduct is indicative of future conduct and performance.

The Public Pension Policy will typically vote against directors who have served on boards or as executives of companies with records of poor performance, inadequate risk oversight, excessive compensation, audit or accounting-related issues, and other actions or indicators of mismanagement. However, the Public Pension Policy will also reevaluate the directors based on factors such as the length of time that has passed since the incident, the director's role, and the severity of the issue.

The Public Pension Policy also considers the oversight afforded to environmental and social issues. The Public Pension Policy looks to ensure that companies maintain appropriate board-level oversight of material risks to their operations, including those that are environmental and social in nature. When it is clear that these risks have not been properly managed or mitigated, the Public Pension Policy may vote against members of the board who are responsible for the oversight of environmental and social risks. In the absence of explicit board oversight of environmental and social issues, the Public Pension Policy may vote against members of the audit committee. In making these determinations, the Public Pension Policy will take into account the situation at hand, its effect on shareholder value, as well as any corrective action or other response made by the company.

Review of Risk Management Controls

The Public Pension Policy evaluates the risk management function of a public company on a case-by-case basis. Companies, particularly financial firms, should have a dedicated risk committee, or a committee on the board in charge of risk oversight, as well as a chief risk officer who reports directly to that committee, not to the CEO or another executive of the company. When analyzing the risk management practices of public companies the Public Pension Policy takes note of any significant losses or write-downs on financial assets and/or structured transactions. In cases where a company has disclosed a sizable loss or write-down, and where the company's board-level risk committee's poor oversight contributed to the loss, the Public Pension Policy will recommend that shareholders vote against such committee members on that basis. In addition, in cases where a company maintains a significant level of financial risk exposure but fails to disclose any explicit form of board-level risk oversight (committee or otherwise), the Public Pension Policy may vote against the chair of the board on that basis.

Slate Elections

In some countries, in particular Italy, companies elect their board members as a slate, whereby shareholders are unable to vote on the election of an individual director, but rather are limited to voting for or against the board as a whole. The Public Pension Policy will generally support the slate if no major governance or board-related concerns have been raised in the analysis, and the slate appears to support and protect the best interests of all shareholders.

Board Responsiveness

Any time 20% or more of shareholders vote contrary to the recommendation of management on compensation or director elections proposals, the board should, depending on the issue, demonstrate some level of responsiveness to address the concerns of shareholders. While the 20% threshold alone will not automatically generate a negative vote from the Public Pension Policy on a future proposal (e.g., to vote against a director nominee, against a remuneration proposal, etc.), it will be a contributing factor to a vote against management's recommendation in the event we determine that the board did not respond appropriately.

As a general framework, the evaluation of board responsiveness involves a review of the publicly available disclosures released following the date of the company's last annual meeting up through the publication date of the most current Proxy Paper.

Separation of the Roles of CEO and Chair

The separation of the positions of CEO and chair creates a better and more independent governance structure than a combined CEO/chair position. The role of executives is to manage the business based on the course charted by the board. Executives should be in the position of reporting and answering to the board for their performance in achieving their goals as set out by the board. This would become more complicated if they too held the position of chair as it would be difficult for them to fulfil the duty of being both the overseer and policy setter when they, the CEO/chair control both the agenda and boardroom.

The Public Pension Policy views an independent chair as better able to oversee the executives of the company and set a pro-shareholder agenda without the management conflicts that a CEO and other executive insiders often face. Such oversight and concern for shareholders allows for a more proactive and effective board of directors that is better able to look out for the interests of shareholders.

Furthermore, it is the board's responsibility to select a chief executive to best serve the company and its shareholders and to replace this person when his or her duties have not been appropriately fulfilled. Such a replacement becomes more difficult and happens less frequently when the chief executive is also in the position of overseeing the board.

However, even considering the above, the Public Pension Policy will not vote against CEOs who also chair the board. The Public Pension Policy will generally support separating the positions of CEO and chair whenever the question is posed in a shareholder proposal, as in the long-term it is in the best interests of the company.

In the absence of an independent chair, the Public Pension Policy will support the appointment of a presiding or lead independent director with authority to set the agenda for the meeting and to lead sessions. In the case where the company has neither an independent chair nor independent lead director, the Public Pension Policy may vote against the chair of the governance committee.

Governance Following an IPO or Spin-off

Companies that have recently completed an initial public offering (“IPO”), or spin-off should be given adequate time to fully adjust and comply with marketplace listing requirements and meet basic corporate governance standards. The Public Pension Policy generally allows the company a one-year period following the IPO to comply with these requirements and as such refrains from voting based on governance standards (e.g., board independence, committee membership and structure, meeting attendance, etc.).

However, there are some cases that warrant shareholder action against the board of a company that have completed an IPO or spin-off in the past year. The Public Pension Policy will evaluate the terms of applicable governing documents when determining the recommendations and whether the shareholders rights will be severely restricted. In order to come to a conclusion, the following points will be considered:

1. The adoption of anti-takeover provisions such as a poison pill or classified board;
2. Supermajority vote requirements to amend governing documents;
3. The presence of exclusive forum or fee-shifting provisions;
4. Whether shareholders can call special meetings or act by written consent;
5. The voting standard provided for the election of directors;
6. The ability of shareholders to remove directors without cause;
7. The presence of evergreen provisions in the company’s equity compensation arrangements; and
8. The presence of a dual-class share structure which does not afford common shareholders voting power that is aligned with their economic interest.

Anti-takeover provisions can negatively impact future shareholders who (except for electing to buy or sell the stock) are unable to weigh in on matters that might negatively impact their ownership interest. In cases where the anti-takeover provision was adopted prior to the IPO, the Public Pension Policy may vote against the members of the board who served when it was adopted if the board:

- (i) Did not also commit to submit the anti-takeover provision to a shareholder vote at the company’s next shareholder meeting following the IPO; or
- (ii) Did not provide a sound rationale or sunset provision for adopting the anti-takeover provision.

FINANCIAL REPORTING

Accounts and Reports

Excluding situations where there are concerns surrounding the integrity of the statements/reports, the Public Pension Policy will generally vote for Accounts and Reports proposals.

Where the required documents have not been published at the time that the vote is cast, the Public Pension Policy will abstain from voting on this proposal.

Income Allocation (Distribution of Dividends)

The Public Pension Policy will generally vote for proposals concerning companies' distribution of dividends. However, particular scrutiny will be given to cases where the company's dividend payout ratio is exceptionally low or excessively high relative to its peers, and where the company has not provided a satisfactory explanation for this disparity.

Appointment of Auditors and Authority to Set Fees

The role of the auditor is crucial in protecting shareholder value. Like directors, auditors should be free from conflicts of interest and should assiduously avoid situations that require them to make choices between their own interests and the interests of the shareholders. Because of the importance of the role of the auditor, rotating auditors is an important safeguard against the relationship between the auditor and the company becoming too close, resulting in a lack of oversight due to complacency or conflicts of interest. Accordingly, the Public Pension Policy will vote against auditor ratification proposals in instances where it is clear that a company's auditor has not been changed for 20 or more years.

In instances where a company has retained an auditor for fewer than 20 years, the Public Pension Policy will generally support management's recommendation for the selection of an auditor, as well as the board's authority to fix auditor fees. However, there are a number of exceptions to this policy, and the Public Pension Policy will vote against the appointment of the auditor and/or the authorization of the board to set auditor fees in the following scenarios:

- The independence of an incumbent auditor or the integrity of the audit has been compromised.
- Audit fees combined with audit-related fees total less than one-half of total fees.
- There have been any recent restatements or late filings by the company and responsibility for such can be attributed to the auditor (e.g., a restatement due to a reporting error).
- The company has aggressive accounting policies.
- The company has poor disclosure or lack of transparency in financial statements.
- There are other relationships, or issues of concern, with the auditor that might suggest a conflict of interest.
- The company is changing auditors as a result of a disagreement between the company and the auditor on a matter of accounting principles or practices, financial statement disclosure, or auditing scope or procedures,

COMPENSATION

Compensation Reports and Compensation Policies

Depending on the market, compensation report and policy vote proposals may be either advisory or binding, e.g. in the UK a non-binding compensation report based upon the most recent fiscal year is voted upon annually, and a forward-looking compensation policy will be subject to a binding vote every three years.

In all markets company filings are evaluated closely to determine how well information pertinent to compensation practices has been disclosed, the extent to which overall compensation is tied to performance, which performance metrics have been employed, as well as how the company's remuneration practices compare to that of its peers.

The Public Pension Policy will vote against the approval of a compensation report or policy in the following scenarios:

- There is a significant disconnect between pay and performance;
- Performance goals and metrics are inappropriate or insufficiently challenging;
- There is a lack of disclosure regarding performance metrics as well as a lack of clarity surrounding the implementation of these metrics.
- Short-term (e.g., generally less than three year) performance measurement is weighted excessively in incentive plans;
- Excessive discretion is afforded to, or exercised by, management or the Compensation Committee to deviate from defined performance metrics and goals in determining awards;
- Ex gratia or other non-contractual payments have been made and the reasoning for this is inadequate.
- Guaranteed bonuses are established;
- Egregious or excessive bonuses, equity awards or severance payments have been granted;
- Excessive increases (e.g. over 10%) in fixed payments, such as salary or pension entitlements, that are not adequately justified
- Where there is an absence of structural safeguarding mechanisms such as clawback and malus policies included in the Incentive plan.

The Public Pension Policy also conducts a further level of analysis by looking at compensation issues as they relate to environmental and social criteria as well as other issues relevant to good corporate governance practices. Specifically, the Public Pension Policy will vote against compensation plans where a company has both failed to provide an adequate link between pay and performance, and the company has neglected to incentivize environmental and social performance. In instances where a company has received a Pay-for-Performance grade of "D" or "F" and Glass Lewis' standard policy has recommended in favor of the plan, the Public Pension Policy will vote against say-on-pay proposals where sustainability is not an explicit consideration for companies when awarding executive compensation. The Public Pension Policy will also support shareholder resolutions requesting the inclusion of sustainability metrics in executive compensation plans.

Long-Term Incentive Plans

The Public Pension Policy recognizes the value of equity-based incentive programs. When used appropriately, they provide a means of linking an employee's pay to a company's performance, thereby aligning their interests with those of shareholders. In addition, equity-based compensation is an effective way to attract, retain and motivate key employees.

In order to allow for meaningful shareholder review, incentive programs should generally include:

- (i) specific and appropriate performance goals;
- (ii) a maximum award pool; and
- (iii) a maximum award amount per employee.

In addition, the payments made should be reasonable relative to the performance of the business and total compensation paid to those included under the plan should be in line with compensation paid by the company's peers.

Performance-Based Equity Compensation

The Public Pension Policy supports performance-based equity compensation plans for senior executives; where it is warranted by both their performance, and that of the company. While it is unnecessary to base equity-based compensation for all employees to company performance, placing such limitations on grants to senior executives is considered advisable (although in specific scenarios equity-based compensation granted to senior executives without performance criteria is acceptable under Glass Lewis guidelines, such as in the case of moderate incentive grants made in an initial offer of employment). While it is not uncommon for a board to state that tying equity compensation to performance goals may hinder them in attracting, and retaining, talented executives, the Public Pension Policy takes the stance that performance – based compensation aids in aligning executive interests to that of shareholders, and as such will support the company in achieving its objectives.

The Public Pension Policy will generally vote in favor of all performance-based option or share schemes; with the exception of plans that include a provision to allow for the re-testing of performance conditions; for which a vote against is recommended.

Director Compensation

The Public Pension Policy supports non-employee directors receiving an appropriate form, and level, of compensation for the time and effort they spend serving on the board and its committees; and director fees being at a level that allows a company to retain and attract qualified individuals. The Public Pension Policy compares the cost of director compensation to that of peer companies with similar market capitalizations in the same country so that compensation plans may be evaluated thoroughly, and a fair vote outcome reached.

Retirement Benefits for Directors

The Public Pension Policy will typically vote against the granting of retirement benefits to non-executive directors. Such extended payments can impair the objectivity and independence of these board members. Initial, and annual fees should be of a level that provides appropriate compensation to directors throughout their service to the company.

Limits on Executive Compensation

As a general rule, shareholders should not seek to micromanage executive compensation programs. Such matters should be left to the board's compensation committee. The election of directors, and specifically those who sit on the compensation committee, is viewed as an appropriate mechanism for shareholders to express their support, or disapproval, of board policy on this issue. Further, companies whose pay-for-performance is in line with their peers should be granted the flexibility to compensate their executives in a manner that drives sustainable growth. However, the Public Pension Policy favors performance-based compensation as an effective means of motivating executives to act in the best interests of shareholders. Performance-based compensation may be limited if a chief executive's pay is capped at a low level rather than flexibly tied to the performance of the company.

GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE

Amendments to the Articles of Association

The Public Pension Policy will evaluate proposed amendments to a company's articles of association on a case-by-case basis. The Public Pension Policy is generally opposed to bundling several amendments under a single proposal as it prevents shareholders from evaluating each amendment on its own merits. In cases, where it is a bundled amendment, the Public Pension Policy will evaluate each amendment individually and only support the proposal if, in the aggregate, the amendments are in the best interests of shareholders.

Anti-Takeover Measures

Multi-class Share Structure

The Public Pension Policy views multi-class share structures as not in the best interests of shareholders and instead is in favor of one vote per share. This structure operates as a safeguard for common shareholders by ensuring that those who hold a significant minority of shares are still able to weigh in on issues set forth by the board. The economic stake of each shareholder should match their voting power and that no small group of shareholders, family or otherwise, should have differing voting rights from those of all other shareholders.

The Public Pension Policy considers a multi-class share structure as having the potential to negatively impact the overall corporate governance of a company. Companies should have share class structures that protect the interests of non-controlling shareholders as well as any controlling entity. Therefore, the Public Pension Policy will generally vote in favor of proposals to eliminate multi-class share structures. Similarly, the Public Pension Policy will typically vote against proposals to adopt a new class of common stock.

Cumulative Voting

When voting on cumulative voting proposals, the Public Pension Policy will factor in the independence of the board and the company's governance structure. Cumulative voting is often found on ballots at companies where independence is lacking and where the appropriate balances favoring the interests of shareholders are not in place. However, cumulative voting increases the ability of minority shareholders to elect a director by allowing shareholders to cast as many shares of stock they own multiplied by the number of directors to be elected. Cumulative voting allows shareholders to cast all their votes for one single nominee, or a smaller number of nominees than up for election, thereby raising the likelihood of electing one or more of their preferred nominees to the board. Accordingly, cumulative voting generally acts as a safeguard for shareholders by ensuring that those who hold a significant minority of shares can elect a candidate of their choosing to the board. As a result, the Public Pension Policy will typically vote in favor proposals concerning cumulative voting.

However, in the case that a company has adopted a true majority vote standard (i.e., where a director must receive a majority of votes cast to be elected, as opposed to a modified policy indicated by a resignation policy only), the Public Pension Policy will vote against cumulative voting proposals due to the incompatibility of the two election methods. For companies, that have not adopted the true majority vote standard but have some form of majority voting, the Public Pension Policy will also recommend voting against cumulative voting proposals if the company has also not adopted anti-takeover provisions and has been responsive to shareholders.

In instances where a company has not adopted majority voting standards and is facing both an election on the adoption of majority voting and a proposal to adopt cumulative voting, the Public Pension Policy will support only the majority voting proposal.

Fair Price Provision

Fair price provisions, which are rare, require that certain minimum price and procedural requirements to be observed by any party that acquires more than a specified percentage of a corporation's common stock. The intention of this provision is to protect minority shareholder value when an acquirer seeks to accomplish a merger or other transaction which would eliminate or change the rights of the shareholder. Fair price provisions sometimes protecting the rights of shareholders in a takeover situation. However, more often than not they act as an impediment to takeovers, potentially limiting gains to shareholders from a variety of transactions that could potentially increase share price. As a result, the Public Pension Policy will generally vote to fair price provisions.

Supermajority Vote Requirements

The Public Pension Policy favors a simple majority voting structure except where a supermajority voting requirement is explicitly intended to protect the rights of minority shareholders in a controlled company. In the case of non-controlled companies, supermajority vote requirements act as impediments to shareholder action on ballot items that are critical to their interests. For example, supermajority vote requirements can strongly limit the voice of shareholders in making decisions on critical matters such as the selling of the business. Supermajority vote requirements can also allow small groups of shareholders to overrule and dictate the will of the majority of shareholders. Thus, having a simple majority is appropriate for protecting the rights of all shareholders.

Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plan)

The Public Pension Policy will generally oppose companies' adoption of poison pills, as they can reduce management accountability by substantially limiting opportunities for corporate takeovers. As a result, rights plans can prevent shareholders from receiving a buy-out premium for their stock. Generally, the Public Pension Policy will vote against these plans to protect shareholders' financial interests. While boards should be given wide latitude in directing the activities of the company and charting the company's course, on an issue such as this where the link between the financial interests of shareholders and their right to consider and accept buyout offers is so substantial, shareholders should be allowed to vote on whether or not they support such a plan's implementation. In certain limited circumstances, the Public Pension Policy will support a limited poison pill to accomplish a particular objective, such as the closing of an important merger, or a pill that contains what we believe to be a reasonable 'qualifying offer' clause.

Increase in Authorized Shares

Adequate capital stock is important to a company’s operation. When analyzing a request for additional shares, the Public Pension Policy will typically review four common reasons why a company may need additional capital stock:

1. Stock Split	Three Metrics: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Historical stock pre-split price (if any) (b) Current price relative to the company’s most common trading price over the past 52 weeks (c) Some absolute limits on stock price (that will either make the split appropriate or would produce an unreasonable price)
2. Shareholder Defenses	Additional authorized shares could be used to bolster takeover defenses such as a poison pill. The proxy filings often discuss the usefulness of additional shares in defending against a hostile takeover.
3. Financing for Acquisitions	Examine whether the company has a history of using stock for acquisitions and attempts to determine what levels of stock have generally been required to accomplish such transactions.
4. Financing for Operations	Review the company’s cash position and its ability to secure financing through borrowing or other means.

The Public Pension Policy will generally support proposals when a company could reasonably use the requested shares for financing, stock splits and stock dividends, as having adequate shares to allow management to make quick decisions and effectively operate the business is critical. The Public Pension Policy favors that, when a company is undertaking significant transactions, management will justify its use of additional shares rather than providing a blank check in the form of large pools of unallocated shares available for any purpose.

Generally, the Public Pension Policy will support proposals to increase authorized shares up to 100% of the number of shares currently authorized unless, after the increase the company would be left with less than 30% of its authorized shares outstanding. In markets where such authorities typically also authorize the board to issue new shares without separate shareholder approval, the Public Pension Policy applies the policy described below on the issuance of shares.

Issuance of Shares

The issuance of additional shares generally dilutes existing shareholders in most circumstances. Further, the availability of additional shares, where the board has discretion to implement a poison pill, can often serve as a deterrent to interested suitors. In cases where a company has not detailed a plan for use of the proposed shares, or where the number of shares far exceeds those needed to accomplish a detailed plan, the Public Pension Policy will typically vote against the authorization of additional shares. In the case of a private placement, the Public Pension Policy will also factor in whether the company is offering a discount to its share price.

Generally, the Public Pension Policy will support proposals to authorize the board to issue shares (with pre-emptive rights) when the requested increase is equal to or less than the current issued share capital. The authority of these shares should not exceed five years unless that is the market best practice. In accordance with the different market practices, the specific thresholds for share issuance can vary. And, as a result, the Public Pension Policy will vote on these proposals on a case-by-case basis.

The Public Pension Policy will also generally support proposals to suspend pre-emption rights for a maximum of 5-20% of the issued ordinary share capital of the company, depending on best practice in the country in which the company is located. This authority should not exceed five years, or less for some countries.

Repurchase of Shares

The Public Pension Policy typically supports proposals to repurchase shares when the plan includes the following provisions:

- (i) A maximum number of shares which may be purchased (typically not more than 10-15% of the issued share capital); and
- (ii) A maximum price which may be paid for each share (as a percentage of the market price).

Reincorporation

A company is in the best position to determine the appropriate jurisdiction of incorporation. The Public Pension Policy will factor in several elements when a management proposal to reincorporate the company is put to vote. These elements include reviewing the relevant financial benefits, generally related to incorporate tax treatment, as well as changes in corporate governance provisions, especially those related to shareholder rights, resulting from the change in domicile. In cases where the financial benefits are too small to be meaningful and there is a decrease in shareholder rights, the Public Pension Policy will vote against the transaction.

Tax Havens

The Public Pension Policy evaluates a company's potential exposure to risks related to a company's tax haven policies on an as-needed basis and will support shareholder proposals requesting that companies report on the risks associated with their use of tax havens or that request that companies adopt policies to discontinue operations or withdraw from tax havens. The Public Pension Policy will also vote against reincorporation proposals when companies have proposed to redomicile in known tax havens.

Advance Notice Requirements

Typically, the Public Pension Policy will vote against provisions that would require advance notice of shareholder proposals or of director nominees. Advance notice requirements typically range between three to six months prior to the annual meeting. These requirements often make it impossible for a shareholder who misses the deadline to present a shareholder proposal or director nominee that may be in the best interests of the company. Shareholders should be able to review and vote on all proposals and director nominees and are able to vote against proposals that appear with little prior notice. Therefore, by setting advance notice requirements it limits the opportunity for shareholders to raise issues that may arise after the window closes.

Transaction of Other Business

In general, the Public Pension Policy will vote against proposals that put the transaction of other business items proposal up for vote at an annual or special meeting, as granting unfettered discretion is unwise.

Anti-Greenmail Provisions

The Public Pension Policy will support proposals to adopt a provision preventing the payment of greenmail, which would serve to prevent companies from buying back company stock at significant premiums from a certain shareholder. The anti-greenmail provision helps to protect the company as it requires that a majority of shareholders other than the majority shareholder approve the buyback, thus, eliminating cases where a majority shareholder could attempt to charge a board a large premium for the shares.

Virtual-Only Shareholder Meetings

A growing number of companies have elected to hold shareholder meetings by virtual means only. The Public Pension Policy supports companies allowing a virtual option alongside an in-person meeting, so long as the shareholder interests are not compromised. Without proper controls, conducting a virtual-only meeting of shareholders could eliminate or significantly limit the rights of shareholders to confront, and ask management on any concerns they may have. When companies decide to only hold virtual-only meetings, the Public Pension Policy will examine the level of disclosure provided by the company on the virtual meeting procedures and may vote against members of the nominating and governance committee if the company does not provide disclosure assuring that shareholders will be afforded the same rights and opportunities to participate as they would at an in-person meeting.

MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND CONTESTED MEETINGS

For merger and acquisition proposals, the Public Pension Policy undertakes a thorough examination of all elements of the transactions and determine the transaction's likelihood of maximizing shareholder return. In order to make a voting recommendation, the Public Pension Policy will examine the process conducted, the specific parties and individuals involved in negotiating an agreement, as well as the economic and governance terms of the proposal.

In the case of contested merger situations, or board proxy fights, the Public Pension Policy will evaluate the plan presented by the dissident party and how, if elected, it plans to enhance or protect shareholder value. The Public Pension Policy will also consider any concerns presented by the board, including any plans for improving the performance of the company, when making the ultimate recommendation. In addition, the Public Pension Policy will support shareholder proposals asking a company to consider the effects of a merger, spin-off, or other transaction on its employees and other stakeholders.

SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS

The Public Pension Policy has a strong emphasis on enhancing the environmental, social and governance performance of companies. Accordingly, the Public Pension Policy will be broadly supportive of governance-related proposals and will take a case-by-case approach to many environmental and social shareholder proposals. Specifically, the Public Pension Policy will generally support any proposal calling for enhanced disclosure of companies' environmental and social initiatives or risks, and will support proposals requesting that companies adopt policies, targets or take other actions when there is evidence that such proposals would materially benefit the company and its shareholders. The Public Pension Policy will also vote in a manner that promotes enhanced disclosure and board accountability. In extraordinary cases when companies have failed to adequately mitigate risks stemming from environmental or social practices, the Public Pension Policy may vote against:

- (i) ratification of board and/or management acts;
- (ii) approving a company's accounts and reports and/or;
- (iii) relevant directors.

General Approach to Environmental and Social Proposals

The Public Pension Policy will generally support proposals requesting increased disclosure on environmental and social issues. For example, the guidelines will support proposals requesting that companies produce sustainability reports or provide reporting on specific environmental or human-rights-related issues. Further, this Policy will support increased disclosure of a company's political or lobbying expenditures, including disclosure of how companies' political contributions align with its corporate values.

The Public Pension Policy will also support proposals requesting reporting on a company's diversity initiatives and the ethnic and gender breakdown of its employees. Furthermore, the Public Pension Policy will support proposals requesting disclosure from companies regarding gender pay inequity and company initiatives to reduce the gap in compensation paid to women compared to men. The Public Pension Policy will also generally support proposals seeking increased disclosure and reporting concerning worker and stakeholder health and safety issues.

In addition, the Public Pension Policy will support well-crafted proposals seeking to have a company take a specific action or adopt a policy when it is clear that such proposals will benefit shareholders or help companies to mitigate a material risk to their operations. When it is not evident that taking such actions or adopting such policies would address an issue of material concern, the Public Pension Policy will generally vote against such proposals. For example, the Public Pension Policy will generally not support proposals requesting that companies adopt the Holy Land Principles (a set of guidelines for companies operating in Israel/Palestine), that companies adopt certain environmental or social policies (such as those related to deforestation or recycling), or that companies cease to make political or charitable contributions, unless it is evident that the Company has mismanaged related issues in a manner that could harm shareholder interests.

Governance Proposals

The Public Pension Policy is broadly supportive of governance-related proposals. For example, the Public Pension Policy supports increased shareholder participation and access to a company and its board of directors. Accordingly, the Public Pension Policy will vote in favor of initiatives that seek to enhance shareholder rights, such as the introduction of majority voting to elect directors, the adoption and amendment of proxy access bylaws, the elimination/reduction of supermajority provisions, the declassification of the board, the submission of shareholder rights' plans to a shareholder vote, and the principle of one share, one vote. The Public Pension Policy will also support proposals seeking to repeal exclusive forum provisions to ensure shareholders are not limited in the selection of forum for legal action.

The Public Pension Policy will also support proposals aimed at increasing the diversity of boards or management as well as those requesting additional information concerning workforce diversity and the adoption of more inclusive nondiscrimination policies. Further, the Public Pension Policy will support enhanced oversight of environmental and social issues at the board level by supporting resolutions calling for the creation of an environmental or social committee of the board and will vote support proposals requesting that the board adopt a subject-matter expert, such as one with deep knowledge and experience in human rights or climate change-related issues when it is evident that such oversight is lacking from a company's boardroom. The Public Pension Policy will also generally vote for proposals seeking to increase disclosure of a company's business ethics and code of conduct, as well as of its activities that relate to social welfare.

Compensation Proposals

The Public Pension Policy will support measures that serve to link executive pay with a company's performance. Accordingly, the Public Pension Policy will support proposals seeking to prohibit or require more disclosure about stock hedging and pledging by executives. The Public Pension Policy will also support proposals requesting that companies adopt executive stock retention policies and those that prohibit the accelerated vesting of equity awards. Furthermore, the Public Pension Policy will support shareholder proposals to link pay with performance, to eliminate or require shareholder approval of golden coffins and to clawback unearned bonuses. Although the Public Pension Policy will support shareholder proposals requesting that companies assess the feasibility of including environmental or social metrics in their executive compensation plans, the guidelines will not support proposals that would require them to adopt specific sustainability metrics in their remuneration schemes.

Trojan Horse Proposals

The Public Pension Policy will carefully examine each proposal's merits in order to ensure it seeks enhanced environmental disclosure and/or practices, and is not conversely aimed at limiting environmental or social disclosure or consideration. Accordingly, the Public Pension Policy will not support such proposals, which are often referred to as "Trojan Horse" proposals.

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